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Heller v. Legislature, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 51, 93 P.3d 746 (July 14, 2004)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW –  
SEPARATION OF POWERS – WRITS OF MANDAMUS 
 
Summary 
On April 2, 2004, The Honorable Dean Heller, Secretary of State of the State of Nevada, 
sought an original petition for a writ of mandamus by the Nevada Supreme Court to compel the 
state Legislature (as a whole) to enforce separation of powers.  The Secretary challenged whether 
state government employees’ service in the state Legislature (dual service) violated the 
constitutional separation of powers doctrine and questioned whether local government 
employees’ service in the Legislature also violated the separation of powers. The petition asked 
the court to: (1) find that service in the Legislature by “certain,” unidentified state executive 
branch employees violated separation of powers; (2) direct the Legislature as a whole to enforce 
separation of powers; and (3) determine whether service in Legislature by local government 
employees violated the separation of powers.  The Secretary relied upon a March 1, 2004 
Attorney General opinion that concluded that the separation of powers “bars any employee 
serving in the executive branch…[from] serving simultaneously as a member of the Nevada 
State Legislature,” but tolerates a local government employee’s simultaneous service as a 
legislator.  
On May 4, 2004, the Legislature filed an answer that listed numerous bars to mandamus 
relief; asserted the Secretary’s only “judicial recourse is to bring an appropriate judicial action 
against the individual legislator…;” and concluded a legislator’s service in state or local 
government employment did not violate the separation of powers. The Nevada Faculty Alliance, 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada, various educational associations and a 
consortium led by the Las Vegas Police Protective Association, Metro, Inc. were permitted to 
file amici briefs.  The amici all joined against the Secretary.   
 On May 20, 2004, the Secretary replied to the Legislature’s answer, and partially altered 
the relief sought to request an interpretation by the court of Nevada Constitution, Article 3, 
Section 1(1) (separation of powers)2, as it pertains to executive branch employees serving in the 
Legislature and for the court to order the Legislature to use that interpretation in its discretionary 
duty to judge the qualifications of its members under Article 4, Section 6.3  The relief sought 
would have applied on a prospective basis only beginning with the February 2005 start of the 
Legislature’s 73d regular session.  
 After an en banc hearing, Nevada Supreme Court Chief Justice Miriam Shearing, and 
Justices Deborah Agosti, Robert Rose, Nancy Becker, A. William Maupin, Mark Gibbons, and 
Michael Douglas, in a per curiam opinion, denied the petition, holding that: (1) the Secretary of 
State did not have standing to seek mandamus relief; (2) the Secretary sued the wrong party at 
the wrong time in that each house of the Legislature has the right to judge member qualifications 
                                                     
1by Keith Brown  
2Nev. Const., art.1, § 1. cl. 1. The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three 
separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. 
3Nev. Const., art. 4, § 6.  Power of houses to judge qualifications, elections and returns of members; selection of 
officers; rules of proceedings; punishment of members. Each House shall judge of the qualifications, elections 
and returns of its own members, choose its own officers (except the President of the Senate), determine the rules 
of its proceedings and may punish its members for disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of two thirds of 
all the members elected, expel a member. 
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without interference from the other house and the Legislature, as a whole, cannot be compelled 
or have legal authority to perform that duty and no concrete controversy yet existed for the court 
to resolve; (3) quo warranto4 was the proper mechanism to challenge title to a public office, not 
writ of mandamus, with each individual legislator named as quo warranto respondents; (4) the 
Legislature could not exempt its members from quo warranto suits; and (5) the separation of 
powers doctrine barred judicial review of state employees’ service in the Legislature. 
 
Issues and Disposition 
Issues 
1) Whether the Secretary of State had standing to seek exclusion of state government 
employees from serving in the Legislature (dual service); 
2) Whether the Secretary had sued the correct party at the correct time; 
3) Whether quo warranto, rather than writ of mandamus, was the proper mechanism to 
try title to public office; 
4) Whether the Legislature could exempt its members from quo warranto suits;  
5) Whether the separation of powers doctrine in the Nevada Constitution barred judicial 
review of state government employees’ service in the Legislature; and 
6) Whether the dual service issue could be subject to judicial review with respect to the 
qualifications for a legislator to serve in the executive branch. 
 
Disposition 
1. No.  The Secretary of State lacked standing to seek mandamus relief regarding the dual 
service issue.  Although not addressed by either the Legislature or the Secretary, the court 
reached the issue of standing because it affected their original jurisdiction.  A mandamus 
writ must be denied if the petitioner cannot demonstrate a direct and substantial interest 
in the legal matter asserted, i.e., the petitioner will gain no direct benefit from its 
issuance, or suffer no direct detriment if denied. 
The Secretary’s only explicit constitutional duties were to keep a true record of 
official acts of the Legislature and executive branch and administer the election process.  
The Secretary only had standing to seek enforcement of state election laws.  The present 
matter did not render the Secretary unable to discharge his official duties without the writ 
relief.  The Secretary had no discernible beneficial interest from the ouster or exclusion 
of state employees serving in the Legislature, nor was it within the scope of the 
Secretary’s administration of the election process.  
2. No.  The Secretary sued the wrong party at the wrong time.  Under the Nevada 
Constitution, the authority to determine members’ qualifications rested with each House, 
rather than the Legislature as a whole.  Neither House may interfere with the seating of 
the other’s members.  Thus, the Legislature, as a whole, had no legal authority to perform 
the act the Secretary sought to compel.  Further, until executive branch employees were 
actually elected and seated in the 73d Legislature, there was no concrete controversy for 
the court to resolve and the matter was not yet ripe for review.  
3. Yes.  Quo warranto was the proper mechanism to try title to public office.  Mandamus 
was ill-suited to determine whether a person unlawfully holds public office because, 
unlike quo warranto, the officeholder need not be made a party and no legal officer of the 
state need authorize the action.  This was in contradiction to Nevada Revised Statutes 
                                                     
4Heller v. Legislature, 93 P.3d 746, 751 (Nev. 2004) (citing 74 C.J.S. QUO WARRANTO § 1, at 96 (2002) (An ancient 
common law writ and remedy to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office)). 
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(NRS) 35.040 and 35.060, that provide that the Attorney General may sue in quo 
warranto and the person allegedly holding the office unlawfully must be named as a 
defendant. 
4.   No.  The Legislature could not exempt its members from quo warranto actions.  The 
court’s powers to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibitions, quo warranto, and 
habeas corpus are derived from the Nevada Constitution, Article 6, §4.  The Legislature’s 
1971 statutory modification to NRS 35.0105 to exempt its members from quo warranto 
actions held invalid because a legislature cannot restrict a court’s original jurisdiction to 
issue writ relief, or to substantially impair or practically defeat the exercise of the court’s 
constitutional powers. 
5.  Yes.  The Nevada Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine barred judicial review of 
a state executive branch employee’s service in the Legislature.  Separation of powers “is 
probably the most important single principle of government declaring and guaranteeing 
the liberties of the people.”6  Nevada Constitution Article 4, §6, expressly reserved to the 
Senate and Assembly the rights to extend, withhold, and withdraw membership status.  A 
constitutional provision that the Legislature “shall judge” the qualifications, returns, and 
elections of its own members insulated a legislator’s qualifications to hold office from 
judicial review.  The only areas in which a court could act with respect to qualifications, 
elections, and returns of legislators was where the legislature had: (1) devised a role for 
the courts by statute, such as deciding election contests; (2) infringed upon personal 
constitutional rights; or (3) imposed extra-constitutional qualifications on the legislator. 
6. Yes.  The dual service issue may be raised as a separation-of-powers challenge to 
legislators working in the executive branch.  Although a court could not review a state 
employee’s qualifications to sit as a legislator, a court could review a legislator’s 
employment in the executive branch.  This was because no state constitutional provision 
gave the executive branch exclusive authority to judge its employees’ qualifications.  
Challenges to executive branch employees invested with sovereign powers and 
occupying public offices were within quo warranto’s exclusive reach.  Declaratory relief, 
coupled with injunctive relief, could be sought against other executive branch employees.  
The attorney general, or someone with a “legally protected interest,” such as a person 
seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator, had the clearest standing to 
bring quo warranto or declaratory relief actions.  Individual legislators would need to be 
named as either quo warranto respondents or declaratory relief defendants.  
 
Commentary 
State of the Law before Heller: 
Before the case, the Nevada Supreme Court had not directly addressed judicial intrusion 
                                                     
5 Nev. Rev. Stat. 35.010 Action in name of State against public officer, association or usurper of public office or 
franchise. A civil action may be brought in the name of the State: 
      1.  Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a public office, civil or military, 
except the office of assemblyman or state senator, or a franchise, within this state, or an officer in a 
corporation created by the authority of this state. 
      2.  Against a public officer, civil or military, except the office of Assemblyman or State Senator, who does or 
suffers an act which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office. 
      3.  Against an association of persons who act as a corporation within this state without being legally 
incorporated. [Emphasis added.] 
      [1911 CPA § 714; RL § 5656; NCL § 9203]—(NRS A 1971, 660) 
6Heller, 93 P.3d at 753 (citing Galloway v. Truesdell, 422 P.2d 237, 241 (Nev. 1967)). 
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upon the right of the Legislature to judge its members qualifications.7  In previous dictum, the 
court recognized that constitutional provisions similar to Nevada Constitution Article 4, §6 
“deprive the courts of jurisdiction to decide election contests for state legislative offices.”8  Nor 
had the court addressed the validity of the Legislature’s 1971 amendment to NRS 35.010(1), 
exempting legislature members from quo warranto actions.  
 
Survey of Other Jurisdictions 
 The Nevada Supreme Court relied heavily upon constitutional jurisprudence in other 
jurisdictions to reach its conclusion in Heller that the separation-of-powers barrier cannot be 
breached to oust a member of the Legislature, for any reason, including dual service.9   The court 
reiterated the finding of the Minnesota Supreme Court that: “[t]here are good reasons for the 
widespread acceptance of the principle…” [against judicial intrusion into legislature’s right to 
judge the elections, returns, and qualifications for office] so as to preserve the independence, 
purity and free choice of the legislature’s own constituents.10 
The Nevada Supreme Court also looked to California, Oregon, and Utah in support of its 
position that judicial review of the dual service issue is barred by the separation-of-powers 
doctrine. 11  The court distinguished a California Court of Appeals case that stated the separation-
of-powers proviso meant that a person may not simultaneously hold positions in different 
departments of the government.12  The Nevada Supreme Court pointed to an express finding by 
the appellate court that the dual service issue was beyond its reach and quo warranto was the 
proper proceeding to directly test the title to all public offices, not writ of mandamus.  
The court also noted the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress is the sole judge of 
whether an elected official meets the qualifications enumerated in the Constitution, except when 
Congress imposes extra-constitutional requirements, such as a resolution barring an individual 
                                                     
7Heller, 93 P.3d at 755 (citing Mengelkamp v. List, 501 P.2d. 1032 (Nev. 1972) (denying writ relief.  Judicial 
intervention not warranted because under-age candidates for Legislature statutorily ineligible to run for office)). 
8 Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467-68 (Nev. 1964). 
9Heller, 93 P.3d at 754-755, citing Foster v. Harden, 536 So.2d 905, 906 (Miss.1988) (refusing to consider an 
election contest which questioned whether a state senator satisfied a residency requirement, because "[e]ach 
legislative body is the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and its action in 
admitting or expelling a member is not reviewable in the courts" (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. 
Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Mo.1970) (declining to consider a quo warranto action to oust a state legislator, 
and stating that no authority existed to contradict the principle that a legislature's power to judge its members' 
qualifications is exclusive); Lessard v. Snell, 155 Or. 293, 63 P.2d 893, 894 (Or. 1937) (barring secretary of state 
from declaring senator's seat vacant, and stating, "We apprehend there is no case in the books--certainly none has 
been cited--where any court has ever ousted a member of a Legislature or directed such co-ordinate branch of the 
government to accept any person as one of its members.").  But cf. State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Schools, 111 
N.M. 495, 806 P.2d 1085, 1095 (N.M.Ct.App.1991) (concluding, without recognizing the New Mexico 
Constitution's qualifications clause, that a school teacher and a school administrator were not barred by separation 
of powers from being legislators).    
10 Heller, 93 P.3d at 754-55, citing Scheibel v. Pavlak, 292 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn. 1979). 
11 See California  War Veteran’s for Justice v. Hayden, 222 Cal. Rptr. 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“unequivocably 
clear” that suit to disqualify assemblyman was barred by California Constitution directives that ‘each house shall 
judge the qualifications and elections of its members.’) (quoting Cal. Const., art. IV, § 5); Lessard v. Snell, 63 P.2d 
893, 894 (Or. 1937) (It would be wholly foreign to our constitutional systems of government for the executive or 
judicial department to determine a matter expressly reserved for the Legislature); State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29 (Utah 
1987) (relying on Utah Constitution provisions that each house shall judge the election and qualifications of its 
members and noting other state courts interpreted analogous constitutional provisions as barring judicial intervention 
into legislatures’ decisions to seat defendants). 
12 Elliott v. Van Delinder, 247 P. 523, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926).  
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representative from resuming their congressional seat because of alleged travel and salary 
payment irregularities.13 
On the subject of the proper mechanism to challenge the title to a public office, the court 
stated that most states recognized quo warranto not only as an adequate remedy to challenge a 
person’s right to hold public office, but it was the exclusive remedy.14  The court particularly 
noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rationale for quo warranto’s exclusiveness based on the 
facts that public officers should not have their authority questioned incidentally in litigation 
between other parties, nor should they have to defend their authority unless they are made a party 
to the proceeding and the proper legal officer of the state had determined the question raised is 
serious and deserved judicial consideration.15 
Thus, the court’s decision to deny a writ of mandamus seeking to oust or exclude 
executive branch employees from serving in the legislature under dual service as being barred by 
the separation-of-powers doctrine appears consistent with federal and state jurisdictions that 
addressed this fundamental constitutional issue.  Likewise, the court’s conclusion quo warranto 
is the proper mechanism to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office rests 
upon a solid foundation and is consistent with other jurisdictions.  
 
Effect of Heller on Current Law 
Any attempt to exclude or oust an executive branch employee from the legislature 
through a judicial proceeding is barred by the separation of powers.16  But, the dual service issue 
may be raised as a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators working in the executive branch.  
Dual service challenges to legislators also employed by the executive branch of state government 
may be brought in district court by the attorney general as a quo warranto action, or as a request 
for declaratory relief by a person demonstrating a direct and substantial interest in the legal right 
asserted.17 
A quo warranto action or request for declaratory relief must name the individual 
legislators as respondents or defendants in order to protect the interests of the officeholder and 
all parties involved.18  The Legislature’s attempt to exempt its members from quo warranto 
actions fails. The Legislature cannot restrict the original jurisdiction of the court to issue writ 
relief by substantially impairing the constitutional powers of the court or defeat their exercise.19  
NRS 35.010 must be must be conformed to delete the impermissible language.  
 
Unanswered Questions 
The court stated the judiciary has the power to review a legislator’s employment in the 
executive branch because there is no constitutional provision exclusively reserving such review 
to the executive branch.20  Nevada has 42 seats in the Assembly and 21 seats in the Senate. With 
a large number of current candidates for Assembly and Senate who are also employed by state or 
                                                     
13 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
14 Heller, 93 P.3d at 751, citing 65 Am. Jur. 2d, QUO WARRANTO, §§ 8-10 (2001); e.g., Ex parte Sierra Club, 674 
So.2d 54, 57 (Ala.1995);  Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 420, 422 (Cal. 2001); Breslin v. 
Warren, 359 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ill. 1977);  Layle v. Schnipke, 186 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Mich. 1971);  Delgado v. 
Sunderland, 767 N.E.2d 662, 665 (N.Y 2002);  State v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260, 267 (Okla.1963); McCracken v. 
Bissett, 203 A.2d 481, 481 (Pa. 1964);  Lewis v. Drake, 641 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.App.1982). 
15 Heller, 93 P. 3d at 755, citing In re Bd. of School Directors of Carroll Township., 180 A.2d 16, 17 (Pa. 1962).  
16 Id, at 757. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 752. 
20 Id. at 757. 
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local governments, such as educators, analysts, or administrators, the potential impact on the 
Legislature could be enormous if these actions are successful.  Given the meager amount a 
Nevada legislator is paid, the costs of defending against such actions could have a chilling effect 
on getting otherwise qualified candidates or incumbents to run for office--even those with 
positive records and years of experience serving in the Legislature. 
The court did not reach the specific question as to whether such dual service as a 
legislator employed in the executive branch actually violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.21 
The court did state such a challenge might well be suited for quo warranto or declaratory relief 
action.22 The court did not answer the question whether legislators employed by local 
government agencies could be challenged.   
  
Conclusion 
The Nevada Constitution bars the judiciary from intruding upon the Senate and 
Assembly’s right to judge their members qualifications under the separation-of-powers 
doctrine.23  While constitutionally barred from reviewing a state employee’s qualification to sit 
as a legislator, the judiciary has the jurisdiction to review a legislator’s employment in the 
executive branch.24 
 The Legislature’s statutory attempt to exempt its members from quo warranto actions 
fails.25  All challenges to dual service after Heller must be raised as quo warranto proceedings by 
the attorney general for any executive branch employee invested with sovereign powers or as 
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief for other executive branch employees by a person 
with a “legally protectable interest,” such as a person seeking the executive branch position held 
by the legislator.26 
 The lack of standing, suing the wrong party, and the constitutional bar against judicial 
review of the qualifications of persons to sit as legislators all support the court’s denial of the 
Secretary’s petition for writ of mandamus.27 
                                                     
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 756-57. 
24 Id, at 757. 
25 Id, at 752. 
26 Id, at 757. 
27 Id. 
